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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from an order disallowing a creditor's claim in a probate proceeding. It
involves Medicaid, also known as "medical assistance," and estate recovery, as provided in Idaho
Code § 56-218. Estate recovery is a program, required by federal law and authorized by state
statute and rules, that seeks to recover assets of deceased Medicaid recipients to reimburse the
state and federal treasuries for medical payments made on behalf of Medicaid recipients. This
matter involves a claim filed by the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (hereinafter the
"Department") in the estate of the deceased spouse of a Medicaid recipient.
Course of Proceedings
The personal representative was appointed on March 19, 2009. The Department filed a
contingent 1 claim, in the amount of$106,251.08, on April 15, 2009. On June 2, 2009, a Notice
ofDisallowance of Claim was filed by the personal representative. On June 15, 2009, the
Department filed its Petition for Allowance of Claim. Hearing was held on the Department's
Petition on February 26, 2010. On March 10, 2010, Judge Bieter issued his Order Disallowing
Claim.
The Department appealed to the District Court by filing a Notice of Appeal on March 18,
2010. Oral argument on appeal was heard by the Honorable Kathryn A. Sticklen on November
18, 2010. Judge Sticklen entered her Memorandum Decision and Order affirming Judge Bieter
on March 16, 2011. This appeal followed.

1

Idaho Code § 15-3-810. The claim was contingent because the Medicaid recipient was still living.
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Statement of the Facts
George D. Perry ("George") was born

nd died February 25, 2009, at the

age of 79. R. pp. 7, 11. Martha J. Perry ("Martha") was b

d died May

3, 2010. 2 Martha was previously known as Martha Jean Boyle and, no later than September 18,
1977, was the owner, as her sole and separate property, of certain real property in Ada County.
R. p. 133. At some point in time later, Martha and George were married. On November 18,
2002, Martha executed a Quitclaim Deed, with the grantor named as "Martha Jean Boyle" and
the grantee as "Martha Jean Perry & George Donald Perry." R. p. 134. On March 3, 2005,
Martha executed a general durable power of attorney, naming George as her attorney-in-fact. R.
pp. 433-9. About July 31, 2006, George purported to transfer Martha's interest in the real
property to himself, signing a Quitclaim Deed on behalf of Martha using the power of attorney.
R. p. 99. About September 15, 2006, George and Martha applied to the Department for medical
assistance to help pay for Martha's medical care. From October 1, 2006, until her death, the
Department provided payment for Martha's medical care, through the Medicaid program. The
primary asset of the estate was the couple's real property which was sold by the personal
representative netting $81,688.95. R. p. 106.

2

Martha Perry was still living at the time of the Department's original claim in this estate.
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ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the Magistrate erred in holding that George Perry, through a general

power of attorney, had the power to divest Martha Perry of her interest in the couple's home, and
gift that interest to himself, even though the power of attorney did not include any gifting power.

2.

Whether the Magistrate erred in holding that Idaho Code§ 56-218(1)- which

authorizes recovery from the estate of the spouse where the assets had been community property,
or had been the property of the Medicaid spouse-is preempted by federal law.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 3
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ARGUMENT

I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
As explained in Idaho Dept. of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 150 Idaho 563,249 P.3d 362
(2011):
In an appeal from the district court, acting in its appellate capacity, this Court:
reviews the trial court (magistrate) record to determine whether there is
substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of
fact and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those
findings. If those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow
therefrom and if the district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, we
affirm the district court's decision as a matter of procedure.

Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 Idaho 559, 561, 633 P.2d 1137, 1139 (1981), quoted in
Doe v. State, 137 Idaho 758, 759-60, 53 P.3d 341, 342-43 (2002).
Idaho Dept. of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 150 Idaho at_, 249 P.3d at 364-5. Moreover, as
stated in Carter v. Carter, 143 Idaho 373, 146 P.3d 639 (2006):
When reviewing the decision of a district court acting in its appellate
capacity over the magistrate division, this Court reviews the magistrate court's
decision independently of, but with due regard for, the district court's intermediate
appellate decision. This Court will uphold the magistrate court's findings of fact if
they are supported by substantial, competent evidence in the record.

Carter v. Carter, 143 Idaho at 378, 146 P.3d at 645. If there are no genuine issues of fact, the
Court freely reviews the issues oflaw. Doe v. Idaho Dept. ofHealth & Welfare, 150 Idaho 491,
_ , 248 P.3d 742, 746 (2011).
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II.

DECISIONS BELOW
The threshold issue before both the Magistrate and the District Court was whether the
General Durable Power of Attorney (R. pp. 433-9) was sufficient to support George's
conveyance of Martha's property to himself. If Martha still had an interest in the property at the
time of her death, then the second issue, relating to preemption, is never reached. The
Department contended the conveyance was not valid because the power of attorney did not
contain any authority to make gifts of Martha's property, nor did it contain any authority
permitting self-dealing. The Magistrate's discussion of this issue in his Order Disallowing Claim

(R. pp. 505-11) is confined to a footnote:
The court has determined that George Perry held a valid power of attorney from
Martha and that he had the authority to transfer the property to himself.
Order Disallowing Claim, p. 1 (R. p. 505). The District Court, for its part, held that express
gifting authority was not necessary, and affirmed the Magistrate.
The other issue in both the Magistrate and District Court was whether Idaho's law
permitting recovery of assets transferred by the Medicaid spouse to the non-Medicaid spouse is
preempted by federal law. While the Magistrate never mentions "preemption," both decisions
below were based on the reasoning in Estate of Barg, 752 N. W.2d 52 (Minn. 2008). The Estate

of Barg case held, in essence, that if the Medicaid spouse conveys her property to the nonMedicaid spouse before death, then that property is out ofreach of Medicaid estate recovery
because recovery can only be made from the remaining, often negligible, estate of the Medicaid
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recipient. The Barg court held that Minnesota's law permitting recovery from the estate of the
non-Medicaid spouse was preempted by federal law.
The Department contended the Barg case should not be applied in Idaho because the case
of Idaho Department of Health and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213, 970 P.2d 6 (1998) and
the case of In re Estate of Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d 882 (N.D. 2000) demonstrate that the federal
definition of "asset" found in 42 U.S.C. § l 396p(h)- never considered in Barg includes
property transferred to the Medicaid recipient's spouse, and therefore, recovery of such property
from the estate of the spouse is not preempted.
The Magistrate did not believe the definition of "assets" in section l 396p(h) was relevant.
Order Disallowing Claim, p. 4 (R. p. 508). The Magistrate, therefore, found the reasoning in

Barg was persuasive and disallowed the Department's claim, effectively finding Idaho's spousal
recovery law is preempted.
The District Court, for its part, believed that the definition of "assets" in subsection (h)
excluded the couple's real property. Memorandum Decision and Order, p. 9 (R. p. 713). This
conclusion was based primarily on the mistaken belief that the definition of "resources" in
section l 396p(h) did not include the couple's home. Id
III.
THE POWER OF ATTORNEY DID NOT AUTHORIZE
GEORGE PERRY TO MAKE A GIFT TO HIMSELF OF
MARTHA'S PROPERTY.

Martha Perry brought the real property into the marriage as her sole and separate property.
R. p. 133. She later conveyed the property to herself and to George, presumably making the
property the couple's community property. R. p. 134. See Idaho Code § 32-906; Dunagan v.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 6
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Dunagan, 147 Idaho 599,602,213 P.3d 384,387 (2009). George later attempted to convey
Martha's remaining interest to himself, executing a Quitclaim Deed to himself as Martha's agent
by virtue of the power of attorney. R. p. 99. This attempted conveyance was invalid, however,
because the general power of attorney contains no provision authorizing the agent to make gifts
of the principle's property to himself or anyone else. R. pp. 433-9.
The District Court disagreed that express authorization to make gifts was required in the
power of attorney:
The power of attorney was executed in 2005 prior to the enactment of the current
Uniform Power of Attorney Act, Idaho Code§ 5-12-101 et seq, in 2008. The
present act requires express authority to make gifts, but it is not applicable here.
No authority has been cited requiring such language prior to the adoption of the
act. Based on the record before it, this Court affirms the interpretation by the
magistrate.
Memorandum Decision and Order, p. 5 (R. p. 709). The District Court may have overlooked the
substantial authority the Department cited at pages 27 to 30 of Appellant's Brief. (R. pp. 551-4 ).
3 Am. Jur. 2d Agency§ 87 plainly states that "The authority of an agent to make a gift on
behalf of the principal must be express." Case law has uniformly supported this view. In

Kunewa v. Joshua, 83 Hawaii 65,924 P.2d 559, 565 (Haw.Ct.App.1996), the court explained:
Moreover, courts have routinely held that in the absence of express written
authorization, an agent may not gratuitously convey the principal's property to
himself. See, e.g., Hodges v. Surratt, 366 So.2d 768 (Fla.App.1978) (agent
exceeded authority in appropriating for agent's own use funds in decedent
principal' s checking account in the absence of clear language to that effect in the
power of attorney), cert. denied, 376 So.2d 76 (Fla.1979); In re Estate of
DeBelardino, 77 Misc.2d 253,352 N.Y.S.2d 858, 863 (Sur.Ct.1974) (power of
attorney, no matter how broadly drawn, cannot be held to encompass an
authorization to attorney-in-fact to make gift to himself of principal' s property;
such a gift carries with it a presumption of impropriety and self-dealing, a
presumption which can be overcome only with the clearest showing of principal's
intent to make the gift), aff'd, 47 A.D.2d 589,363 N.Y.S.2d 974 (1975).
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 7
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Kunewa, 83 Hawaii at 71, 924 P.2d at 565 (underline added); see also Matter ofEstate of
Crabtree, 550 N.W.2d 168 (Iowa,1996) (absent express grant in power of attorney, of power to
make gift, attorney-in-fact did not have that power); Aiello v. Clark, 680 P.2d 1162, 1166
(Alaska 1984) (in the absence of express authority to make a gift, none may be made); Cheloha v.

Cheloha, 255 Neb. 32, 582 N.W.2d 291 (1998) (no gift may be made by an attorney in fact to
himself unless the power to make such a gift is expressly granted in the instrument itself).
As stated in 73 A.L.R. 884 - Power of attorney as authorizing gift or conveyance or

transfer without a present consideration:
According to the established rule, powers of attorney will be given a
narrow and restricted construction, and will be held to grant only those powers
which are expressly specified and such others as are essential to carry into effect
the expressed powers.

***

A general power of attorney authorizing an agent to sell and convey
property, even though it authorizes him to sell for such price and on such terms as
to him shall seem proper, implies a sale for the benefit of the principal, and does
not authorize the agent to make a gift of the property, or to convey or transfer it
without a present consideration inuring to the principal.
73 A.L.R. 884 a t _ (citations omitted; underline added).
Idaho has long followed these same principles. In Idaho, powers of attorney are strictly
construed to not authorize acts beyond those specified. In the case of Arthur v. Kilpatrick Bros.

Co., 47 Idaho 306,274 P. 800 (1929) the plaintiff in a quiet title action died following judgment
for the defendant, but before the notice of appeal was filed. The plaintiffs son, holding a power
of attorney, purported to convey the property to another relative who sought to substitute-in to
continue the appeal. The Court, however, found that the power of attorney was insufficient to
authorize the conveyance of the real property to another:
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 8
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The instrument is denominated "special power of attorney," and
admittedly does not expressly give Edward B. Arthur the power to convey real
estate of Edward J. Arthur, but grants him "full power and authority to do and
perform all and every act and thing whatsoever requisite and necessary to be done
in and about the premises (concerning all property belonging to Edward J. Arthur
within the State ofldaho) as fully to all intents and purposes as he might or could
do if personally present, hereby ratifying and confirming all that his said attorney,
Edward B. Arthur shall lawfully do or cause to be done by virtue of these
presents." It is seen that this power of attorney contains no authority to convey
real estate, eo nomine, and as such instruments are subject to strict interpretation,
without regard to parol evidence, and are not to be construed as authorizing acts
beyond those specified, our conclusion is that the deed to Catherine J. Arthur was
ineffective by reason of insufficiency of the power of attorney to authorize
conveyance ofreal estate. It follows, therefore, that the request of Catherine J.
Arthur to be substituted as appellant in the cause and to continue the same in her
name and right must be denied.

Arthur v. Kilpatrick Bros. Co., 47 Idaho at_, 274 P. at 801 (citation omitted; underline added);
see also Eaton v. McWilliams, 52 Idaho 145, 12 P.2d 259 (1932) ("a power of attorney to sell
lands must be strictly construed and cannot be extended by construction").
Also, an agent may only act for the benefit of his principle. In the case of Jensen v.

Sidney Stevens Implement Co., 36 Idaho 348,210 P. 1003 (1922), the Idaho Supreme Court said:
... [I]f an agent makes any profit in the course of his agency because of his failure
to inform his principal of facts known to him, or which in the exercise of due
diligence he should have ascertained for his principal, the profits of such
transaction, as a matter oflaw, will belong exclusively to the agent's principal.
The law guards the fiduciary relation, which the relation of principal and agent is,
with jealous care. It seeks to prevent the possibility of a conflict between duty and
personal interest. It demands that the agent shall work with an eye single to the
interest of his principal. It forbids him from acting adversely to his principal,
either for himself or for others.

Jensen, 36 Idaho at_, 210 P. at 1005 (underline added). In this case, the agent not only made a
gift of the principle's property, but he made it to himself.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 9
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The District Court may have been under the impression that George's conveyance of
Martha's property interest to himself was in furtherance of Martha's Medicaid eligibility. In the
statement of facts the court wrote:
To qualify for government assistance with medical costs, the couple and Martha,
individually, could not exceed certain maximum asset criteria. On or about July
31, 2006, George made the transfer now in dispute, assigning Martha's remaining
interest in the real property to himself alone, by signing a quitclaim deed on behalf
of Martha pursuant to a power of attorney.
Memorandum Decision and Order, pp. 1-2 (R. pp. 705-6). If this was the Court's belief, it is
mistaken. As discussed below, for purposes of Medicaid eligibility, the home is not counted as a
resource. 42 U.S.C. § 1382b(a)(l). There was no benefit to Martha from George's conveyance.
While Idaho only recently codified the long standing rule that for an agent to make gifts
of the principle's property an express authorization is required, Idaho Code§ 32-912 has long
required an "express power of attorney" for one spouse to convey or encumber community
property:

32-912. Control of community property. -Either the husband or the
wife shall have the right to manage and control the community property, and
either may bind the community property by contract, except that neither the
husband nor wife may sell, convey or encumber the community real estate unless
the other joins in executing the sale agreement, deed or other instrument of
conveyance by which the real estate is sold, conveyed or encumbered, and any
community obligation incurred by either the husband or the wife without the
consent in writing of the other shall not obligate the separate property of the
spouse who did not so consent: provided, however, that the husband or wife may
by express power of attorney give to the other the complete power to sell,
convey or encumber community property, either real or personal. All deeds,
conveyances, bills of sale, or evidences of debt heretofore made in conformity
herewith are hereby validated.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 10
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Idaho Code§ 32-912 (emphasis added). The title company may have recognized this defect
when it required the signature of Martha on the closing statement when the personal
representative sold the real property. 3 R. p. 106.
The term "express power of attorney" must mean more than a general authorization.
Blacks Law Dictionary, 5th Edition, defines "express" as follows:
Clear; definite; explicit; plain; direct; unmistakable; not dubious or ambiguous.
Declared in terms; set forth in words. Directly and distinctly stated. Made known
distinctly and explicitly, and not left to inference. Manifested by direct and
appropriate language as distinguished from that which is inferred from conduct.
The word is usually contrasted with "implied."
Blacks Law Dictionary, 5th Edition (citation omitted). There is no express language in the power
of attorney at issue. At best, there is authority to sell, for fair value. Any authority to make gifts
at all, much less to oneself, must be implied, and is not "express."
The District Court erred in holding that no express gifting authority was required to
authorize George Perry to convey Martha's real property interest to himself.

IV.
THE HOME OF A MEDICAID RECIPIENT AND HER
SPOUSE IS AN "ASSET" AS DEFINED IN FEDERAL
ESTATE RECOVERY LAW.
A.
Idaho Law Permits Recovery from the Estate of the Spouse of a Medicaid Recipient
Where the "Assets" Are Traceable to Jointly Owned Property or the Property of the Medicaid
Recipient.
Idaho Code§ 56-218 authorizes recovery from the estate of both the Medicaid recipient
and her spouse:

3

Barbara K McCormick signed not only as personal representative for George's estate, but also as attorney in
fact for Martha.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 11
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Except where exempted or waived in accordance with federal law medical
assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf of an individual who was
fifty-five (55) years of age or older when the individual received such assistance
may be recovered from the individual's estate, and the estate of the spouse, if any,
for such aid paid to either or both;
Idaho Code§ 56-218(1) (underline added). IDAPA16.03.09.900.20 and .24 limits the
Department's application of this broad authorization to "assets of the estate that had been, at any
time after October 1, 1993, community property, or the deceased participant's share of the
separate property, and jointly owned property." IDAPA16.03.09.900.20 (3-30-07) 4
Therefore, Idaho law permits recovery from the estate of either spouse, so long as the
assets are traceable to the couple's community property, or the assets had been the property of the
Medicaid recipient.
B.
Federal Medicaid Law Defines "Assets" to Include Property, Including the Couple's
Home, Conveyed to the Non-Medicaid Spouse.
42 U.S.C. § 1396p is the federal statute dealing with Medicaid recovery and asset
transfers. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) requires states to seek recovery of Medicaid payments made on
behalf of certain individuals, including individuals over the age of 55. Section 1396p(b)(1 )(B)
states:
(B) In the case of an individual who was 55 years of age or older when the
individual received such medical assistance, the State shall seek adjustment or
recovery from the individual's estate ....
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(l)(B). In the case of Estate of Barg, 752 N.W.2d 52 (Minn. 2008), the
Minnesota Supreme Court was convinced that because this section requires recovery from the
"individual's" estate, recovery from property transferred to the spouse was not permitted.

4

These rules have been renumbered and are now found at IDAPA 16.03.09.905.01 and .05.
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However, the Barg court never considered the rest of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p, including the special
definition of assets found in subsection (h) of that section.
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) contains an expanded definition of the term "estate" for
purposes of Medicaid estate recovery. Under this section, the recoverable "estate" includes:
... any other real and personal property and other assets in which the individual
had any legal title or interest at the time of death (to the extent of such interest),
including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased
individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate,
living trust, or other arrangement.
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) (underline added). The word "assets" has been underlined because
it, too, has a special definition for purposes of Medicaid estate recovery. Subsection (h) of
section 1396p provides, in part, as follows:

Definitions
In this section, the following definitions shall apply:
(1)
The term "assets", with respect to an individual, includes all
income and resources of the individual and of the individual's spouse, including
any income or resources which the individual or such individual's spouse is
entitled to but does not receive because of action (A)
by the individual or such individual's spouse,
(B)
by a person, including a court or administrative body, with legal
authority to act in place of or on behalf of the individual or such individual's
spouse, or
(C)
by any person, including any court or administrative body, acting at
the direction or upon the request of the individual or such individual's spouse.
(h)

***
(5)
The term "resources" has the meaning given such term in section
1382b of this title, without regard (in the case of an institutionalized individual) to
the exclusion described in subsection (a)(l) of such section.
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h) (emphasis added). Therefore, where section 1396p refers to the assets of
an "individual," those assets include the assets of the spouse and assets transferred to the spouse.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 13
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This special definition of assets was discussed by the Idaho Supreme Court in the case of

Idaho Department ofHealth and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213,970 P.2d 6 (1998). 5 The
North Dakota Supreme Court in In re Estate of Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d 882 (N.D. 2000) relied on this
same reasoning to uphold recovery from the estate of the spouse in that state.

C.

The District Court Misunderstood a Critical Cross Reference in the Federal Law.
The District Court did not believe that the definition of "assets" in subsection (h) of

section 1396p included the couple's home:
More importantly, the definition of "resources" as listed in 1396p(h)(5),
"has the meaning given such term in section 1382b[.]" Thus, the definition of
"resources," specifically excludes "the home (including the land that appertains
thereto)." 42 U.S.C. 1382b(a)(l). Accordingly, where "resources" as contained in
this section (1396p(h)) specifically excludes the home, the Court finds it
necessarily excludes it from the definition of "assets" as well. Thus, even with
this expanded definition of"assets" applied to§ 1396p(b)(4)(A),(B), the Court
finds it fails to expand that recovery provision to include real property owned by a
recipient prior to death.
Memorandum Decision and Order, p. 9 (R. p. 713) (underline added). Admittedly, the federal
law is convoluted and difficult to read with its many cross references to other equally convoluted
sections oflaw. However, the District Court omitted an important part of the definition of
"resources."
As noted above, when speaking of the "individual" the assets of the "estate" includes the
"resources" of the individual's spouse. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(l). "Resources" is defined in 20
C.F.R. § 416.1201 to mean, with some qualifications, "cash or other liquid assets or any real or

5

The District Court was under the impression that the Department's reliance on Jackman was "based largely on
the original opinion in that case, which has since been substituted." Memorandum Decision and Order, p. 17. R. p. 721.
However, the Department only cited one paragraph of the original decision to explain why the Court made such an
extensive discussion of the definition of"assets" in the final opinion. The Department extensively quoted the final
Jackman decision where the critical language relating to the importance of the definition of"assets" is found. See
Appellant's Brief, pp. 19-22, 24 (R. pp. 543-6, 548) and Appellant's Reply Brief, pp. 21-23 (R. pp. 676-8).

APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 14

Z:\MReases\Estate\wee\ wee Open eases\PenyM&G\Supreme eourt\Appellants Brief. wpd

personal property that an individual (or spouse, if any) owns and could convert to cash to be used
for his or her support and maintenance." Section 1382b provides certain exclusions to
"resources" that are applicable in determining eligibility for Medicaid. Among these is the
exclusion for the family home:
(a)

Exclusions from resources
In determining the resources of an individual (and his eligible
spouse, if any) there shall be excluded ( 1)
the home (including the land that appertains thereto)
42 U.S.C. § 1382b(a)(l). This is why when determining Medicaid eligibility, the family home is
not counted as a resource. However, everything changes when it comes to estate recovery which
is governed by section 1396p. The definition of "resources" for purposes of estate recovery
specifically includes the family home:
(5)
The term "resources" has the meaning given such term in section
1382b of this title, without regard ... to the exclusion described in subsection
(a)(l) of such section.
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(5) (underline added). It is this "without regard" language in the definition
that the District Court omitted and overlooked. This means that in determining eligibility, the
home is not counted, but for purposes of estate recovery, the family home may be recovered.
Therefore, "asset" as defined in section 1396p specifically includes the home that has been
conveyed to the spouse.

v.
CONCLUSION
The general durable power of attorney that George Perry attempted to use to convey
Martha's community interest in the real property to himself contained no authorization to make
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gifts and no express authorization to dispose of Martha's community property. The attempted
conveyance was invalid and the question of preemption does not arise in this case.
The District Court did not believe the definition of "assets" in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h) was
applicable to the expanded definition of "estate" because it concluded that "resources" did not
include the couple's real property. That conclusion is in error. The Department's recovery of the
couple's home is not preempted, whether it was validly conveyed to George or not.
The Department requests that the decision of the Magistrate be reversed and the
Department's claim against this estate be allowed in full.

C.W.cci7CARTWRIGHT
Deputy Attorney General
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